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There Is No Textualist Position 
STANLEY FISH 
I. 
Some years ago as I was driving my father back to his apartment, we 
approached an intersection with a stop light that had turned red.  He said, 
“Go through the light.” 
What did he mean?  At the time I didn’t take him to be telling me, 
“Don’t stop, just barrel on through.”  Instead, I took him to be telling 
me, “As soon as the light turns green, drive straight ahead; don’t turn 
either left or right.”  How did I come to that determination?  The answer 
many would give is that I set aside a plain or literal meaning and 
substituted for it a meaning that corresponded to what I took to be his 
intention.  I reasoned that my father could not have meant what he 
said—he could not have been directing me to break the law—and I 
quickly (and without much thought) settled on a meaning that “made 
more sense.”  This account of the matter is in line with the distinction 
(standard in mainstream philosophy of language), between sentence 
meaning and speaker’s meaning, between the meaning an utterance has 
by virtue of the lexical items and syntactic structures that make it up, and 
the meaning a speaker may have intended but not achieved.  It is because 
these are distinguishable entities (or so the standard story goes) that they 
can come apart, and when they do one can say, as one might in the case 
of the present example, my father said X, but he meant Y; his words, 
literally construed, say one thing, but it was his purpose to say 
something else.  What I did could then be described as an act of choice: 
In stopping the car and waiting for the light, I chose to hearken to my 
father’s purposive meaning—his intention—rather than to the plain 
meaning of his sentence; and again, that choice is available because it is 




possible to distinguish between the two. 
I do not believe that Justice Antonin Scalia would have any problem 
with this account of my reasoning—and remember it is not my account, 
but the account a philosopher of a certain kind would give—but I am 
confident that he would resist any effort to transfer that reasoning to the 
arena of legal interpretation; for, as he declares in A Matter of Interpretation, 
ours is a government of laws—of texts written down—not men, and 
therefore it would be simply undemocratic “to have the meaning of a law 
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the 
lawgiver promulgated.”1  It is what is “said” not what it is “intended” 
that is “the object of our inquiry.”2  “Men may intend what they will; but 
it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.”3  Not only is this a 
matter of democratic principle for Scalia, it is a matter of safeguarding 
law’s stability and predictability: while words are material and available 
for inspection, intentions are not, and because they are not, they provide 
an insufficient constraint on those judges who might be tempted to 
rewrite the law in the guise of interpreting it. 
The practical threat [of taking intention as the object of interpretation] is that, 
under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative 
intents, . . . judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires . . . .  When 
you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the 
basis of what it meant . . . your best shot at figuring out what the legislature 
meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; 
and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think 
it ought to mean . . . .4
So while Scalia might think that I was right to choose my father’s 
intent over what his words literally said (this would be his characterization 
not mine), he would think it wrong of me to make the same choice were 
I a judge and asked to choose between what the law, literally construed, 
said and some account of the intention (conjured up from who knows 
where) of those who enacted it. 
In Scalia’s argument and the arguments of other self-identified textualists, 
the issue is always framed in this way—as a choice between something 
materially available (the text and the built-in sense it bears) and 
something absent and speculative (the intention of its author); and given 
that formulation of the issue, it seems reasonable and prudent to choose 
as he does.  But is the idea of such a choice intelligible?  I think not, 
despite its common sense appeal.  First of all, for there to be a choice, 
 1. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 2. Id. at 16. 
 3. Id. at 17. 
 4. Id. at 17–18. 
FISH.DOC 6/6/2005  8:57 AM 
[VOL. 42:  629, 2005]  There Is No Textualist Position 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 631 
any choice, there must be distinguishable entities to choose between.  In 
the case of this choice, there must be a textual meaning—a meaning a 
sentence has as its property—that one could either adhere to or depart 
from; for only then could this textual meaning be chosen or chosen 
against.  So what textual meaning did I choose against when I heard my 
father as saying, “after the light turns green, go straight and don’t make 
any turns”?  The answer a textualist would give is that I chose against 
the literal meaning of “go through the light,” that is, against the meaning 
arrived at by simply parsing the words: the imperative “go through” plus 
the object of the imperative, “the light.”  But were I to hear my father 
say that, it would not be because I heard his words apart from any 
intention within which they were uttered, but because I heard the words 
within the assumption of an intention different from the one I would 
have had to assume in order to hear him telling me to go straight ahead 
and not make any turns.  The question here is, with which of two 
possible purposes (there could be many more) did my father produce 
these words?  It is a question that the words themselves cannot answer, 
for if they could there would be no question and no interpretive issue.  
Intention cannot be separated from meaning or thought of in conflict 
with it.  The choice is not between what my father said and what he 
meant, but between two specifications of what he meant.  Did he mean 
(intend) to give directions to a son so hopelessly professorial that he 
could not be trusted to know where he was going, or did he mean 
(intend) to instruct that son to break the law, perhaps because he was late 
for an appointment, perhaps because he suddenly felt a pain in his chest, 
or perhaps because he enjoyed flouting authority and taking minor risks? 
But, a textualist might say, one of those intentions is encoded in the 
language and remains the basic textually determined intention from 
which one might reason away in special circumstances; absent special 
circumstances, “Go through the light” means exactly what it says: go 
through the light.  Not really.  Suppose we re-imagine the moment of my 
father’s utterance and put it at the end of a conversation in which I had 
asked him, “If you were late for an appointment or felt ill or had learned 
of an emergency, would you stop at the red light or go through it?”  If he 
then replied, “Go through the light,” I would have understood him 
neither as giving me directions nor as urging me to commit an illegal act, 
but as saying to me, “This is what I would do in the situation you 
describe; I would go through the light.”  I would not have heard “Go 
through the light” as an imperative but as an answer to my question, and 
FISH.DOC 6/6/2005  8:57 AM 
 
632 
I would have heard it as such immediately, in one stage, not two.  As 
words alone, “Go through the light” has no determinate meaning, as an 
imperative or anything else.  Once the words are heard within the 
assumption of an intention, they acquire a meaning, and the meaning 
they acquire will vary with the intention posited for them. 
A textualist could still have a comeback: he or she could say that in 
my re-imagination of the scene, the meaning of the words “Go through 
the light” is determined by the verbal context, by my question to my 
father.  Context, after all, is just more text, and isn’t it this extended text 
that determines what I will understand when my father replies?  Isn’t it 
text that finally constrains meaning?  But to play the scene out one step 
further, I could have been wrong to hear my father as answering my 
speculative question; he might have experienced a sharp pain just as I 
asked it and instructed me to go through the light (and I might have 
misunderstood him, thus putting him in danger).  Or he might have been 
day dreaming, and not listening to me at all, and he might have roused 
himself just in time to remind me that our destination lay ahead and not 
to the left or the right.  I stand by my position: text alone, no matter how 
long and dense, can never yield meaning, whereas intention, whether 
assumed, discovered, or revealed, can always alter a meaning that had 
previously been in place; not because what had been said has been 
trumped by what was intended, but because one understanding of what 
was intended has been dislodged by another. 
And what if no intention were in place?  In that case not only would 
there not be a meaning; there would be no reason to seek one.  That is, if 
I were persuaded that what I was looking at or hearing was not animated 
by any intention, I would regard it not as language, but as random 
marks—akin to the “garbage” one types in when testing to see if the font 
is one you like—or mere noise, throat clearings.  And, conversely, if the 
sounds issuing from my father were heard as meaningful, were heard as 
words, it would be because I had heard them as issuing from a purposive 
being, a being that is capable of having intentions and having one at this 
moment.  Just which one is what I had to figure out (did he mean x or 
did he mean y?); what I could not have figured out or even begun to 
figure out is what his words meant apart from any intention he may have 
had in uttering them.  The instant I try to construe the words, the instant 
that I hear the sounds as words, the instant I treat them as language, I 
will have put in place some purpose—to give directions, to give orders, 
to urge haste, to urge outlaw behavior—in the light of which those 
sounds become words and acquire sense.  Words alone, without an 
animating intention, do not have power, do not have semantic shape, 
and are not yet language; and when someone tells you (as a textualist 
always will) that he or she is able to construe words apart from intention 
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and then proceeds (triumphantly) to do it, what he or she will really have 
done is assumed an intention without being aware of having done so.  A 
sequence of letters and spaces like “Go through the light” has no 
inherent or literal or plain meaning; it only has the meanings (and they 
are innumerable) that emerge within the assumption of different 
intentions.  Scalia approvingly quotes Justice Jackson as declaring: “We 
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute 
means.”5  My point is that if you do not want to know about intention, 
you do not want to know about meaning.  It is not simply that (like love 
and marriage in a bygone age) they go together; they are inseparable 
from one another. 
There is at least one more possible turn to this particular screw.  
Suppose I am sure that what my father is telling me is to stop at the light 
and then go straight ahead, but I decide, in order either to be 
mischievous or to make a point about language, to charge on through.  I 
know his intention (in the only sense of “know” relevant; I am confident 
of it), but I choose to act as if he had another one.  Were he to rebuke 
me, I might then respond, “but that’s what you told me to do in so many 
words.”  That is, I can become, for the moment, an insincere textualist, 
although I know full well that it is not his words alone, but his words 
understood as the vehicle of an intention, that gives rise to a particular 
meaning.  Here we see that because it is not words alone but words as 
tokens of an intention that mean, a space can be opened up in which 
someone with a mind to can endow another’s words with an intention he 
knows the speaker or writer not to have had.  This possibility will often 
be exploited by an administrator.  Let’s say that I am a dean, and that I 
receive a letter from the chairman of a committee charged with 
delivering a report whose findings will guide my college for the next 
five years.  The letter reads, “Dear Dean Fish, I hereby resign my 
position as head of The Glorious Future Committee.  I take this action 
because I cannot do the job without the additional office space that 
would allow me to store confidential materials and conduct interviews.  
As you know I have many times requested such space, but I have not 
received a positive response.  Sincerely yours, John Smith.”  Now 
suppose that in the course of my deanship I have received many such 
letters (as indeed I have), and I know that in the case of at least half of 
 5. Id. at 23 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 
(1920) (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 




them, the letter is a ploy and the intention is not to resign, but to bargain 
or extort.  Suppose too that Professor Smith, for personal and professional 
reasons known to me, does not really want to resign; what he wants to 
do is negotiate.  At that moment, I am sitting pretty.  Because words 
alone cannot deliver meaning, and because meaning will vary when 
different intentions are assigned to the words, and because words cannot 
refuse the intention assigned them (if they could they would indeed 
contain or embody meaning all by themselves) and because no amount 
of words, no degree of explicitness will necessarily protect words from 
the intention you assign them (a postscript like “I’m willing to discuss 
the matter” won’t afford sufficient protection), I am perfectly free to 
accept Professor Smith’s resignation if I want to, even though I know 
that his “sincerely yours” is a lie; and if he later were to protest that it 
was not his intention to resign, I could reply with a perfectly straight 
face (but with duplicity in my heart), “but that’s what your words said.” 
Notice that this strategy would not be available to me if words really 
did carry fixed or even relatively fixed meanings; for then the words 
could be pressed until they yielded a meaning that would stop me short 
as a matter of linguistic fact; the words, in and of themselves, would 
exclude the meaning I tried to assign them.  Of course words can stop 
me short, in this instance and in any other, if, for example, my 
assignment of an intention doesn’t take with those who must ratify it, or 
if I am low in mental energy and just cannot see past the first intentional 
meaning that occurs to me, or if intention is specified by a public 
formula, as when I casually raise my hand at an auction and end up 
buying a pink elephant.  However, in any of these cases it is not the 
words that will have stopped me, but some contingent feature of an 
empirical situation.  Theoretically, nothing stands in the way of any 
string of words becoming the vehicle of any intention.  Wittgenstein 
famously asks: “Can I say ‘bububu’ and mean ‘If it doesn’t rain I shall 
go for a walk?’”6  The answer is yes.  Of course you may not communicate 
that meaning (or any other) by saying “bububu”; but failure to communicate 
a meaning does not meant that it was not intended; and while the success 
of communication will often be a contingent matter, dependent on others 
and the world, the success of intending (assuming that you are not 
mentally ill and incapable of forming an intention) is certain.  Wittgenstein 
presents this as if it were an extreme example, but in fact it is perfectly 
ordinary; his question is no different from the question “Can you say 
‘yes’ and mean ‘no’?” or the question “Can you say ‘I guess so’ and 
mean ‘absolutely not,’” and in both instances the answer would be yes. 
 6. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS: THE ENGLISH TEXT 
OF THE THIRD EDITION 18e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1973). 
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What this all adds up to is the title assertion of this Article: there is no 
textualist position. There is no textualist position because there is no 
candidate on behalf of whom a would-be textualist could argue.  A 
textualist like Scalia will say that his candidate is the text and that 
meaning can be decoded by looking to the combination of lexical items 
(as they are glossed in standard dictionaries) and grammatical structures, 
with a little help, in the case of obscurity or ambiguity, from legislative 
history or judicial precedent.  But, as I have been arguing, lexical items 
and grammatical structures by themselves will yield no meaning—will 
not even be seen as lexical items and grammatical structures—until they 
are seen as having been produced by some intentional agent.  A text 
whose meaning seems perspicuous and obvious right off the bat is a text 
for which an intentional context has already been assumed, and it is also 
a text whose clarity and stability can always be troubled by an argument 
designed to put another intentional context (and another perspicuous 
meaning) in place.  It is the specification or assumption of intention that 
comes first; the fact of a text with meaning comes second.  The text, in 
short, has no independence; it is an entirely derivative entity—something 
else (an animating intention) must be in place before it can emerge, as 
text—and as a derivative entity it cannot be said to be the source or 
location of meaning.  Nor can there be a middle position in which the 
text is a partial source of meaning, with the rest supplied by a little bit of 
intention, a little bit of history, and a little bit of context.  This is the 
“pluralist” or “synthetic” approach,7 but it fails for the same reason that 
full-blooded textualism fails: something that has no identity or property 
of its own (except for the physical property of being made out of shapes 
and spaces), something that can be successively appropriated, something 
that is not a some thing, but a vehicle, can no more be responsible for 
some portion of meaning than it can be responsible for all of meaning.  
You cannot anchor a method in a nonentity, in a notion—the text—that 
can neither produce nor constrain anything, that cannot even be in the 
absence of an informing and animating spirit. 
It is because words alone can neither produce nor constrain meaning 
 7. For a pluralist approach, see Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to 
Interpretation: Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533 (2005).  For the synthetic 
approach, see Samuel C. Rickless, A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 519 (2005). 




that they cannot settle disputes about what an utterance or writing means.  
In the world of Milton studies, the longest standing dispute (unlikely ever to 
be ended) is about what the words “two-handed engine” mean at line 
130 of Lycidas: “But that two-handed engine at the door/Stands ready to 
smite once, and smite no more.”8  Non-Miltonists might be surprised and 
even appalled to find out that gallons of ink and reams of computer 
paper have been sacrificed in the effort to figure this puzzle out.  
Dictionaries, bestiaries, parliamentary records, volumes of theology, 
judicial proceedings, medieval allegories, royal pronouncements—these 
and many more “sources” have been ransacked for clues.  But clues to 
what?  Not clues to what the phrase means, but clues to determining 
which of the scores of accounts of what the phrase means (each 
supported by extensive research) can persuasively be linked up by some 
trail of evidence with what Milton had in mind.  It is not hard at all to 
assign the phrase a meaning that would have been intended by someone 
who had this or that in mind; what has proven to be hard is to 
demonstrate to everyone’s (or nearly everyone’s) satisfaction that this or 
that was what Milton (not the compiler of a dictionary or the author of a 
bestiary or a church father) had in mind when he sat down to write the 
poem.  (And even if he had meant to leave the meaning of “two-handed 
engine” vague or ambiguous, that too would be an intention which 
could, at least in principle, be figured out.)  A successful demonstration 
will not be achieved by scrutinizing large amounts of historical material; 
for the material, no matter how vast and no matter how thoroughly 
studied from every angle, will not yield the meaning of “two-handed 
engine.”  Success (at least for a time) will follow when a selection of 
those materials is structured into an argument about what Milton 
intended and that argument has the effect of persuading others who had 
built a case for alternative intentions to quit the field and say “You’re 
right.” 
I said in a parenthesis that this particular dispute may never be settled.  
This is not a theoretical point or a point about the inherent ambiguity of 
language (language has neither fixity nor ambiguity as a property; to 
assert either is to be a textualist), but an empirical one.  It has been over 
350 years and the two-handed engine is still a puzzle and the odds are 
that it will stay that way (although you can never tell).  No doubt Milton 
had an intention and if we could figure it out, we would know what 
“two-handed engine” means, but the problem has been around for a long 
time and we may never figure it out.  Now, in literary studies, that is a 
perfectly fine state of affairs, even a fortunate one.  For more than forty 
 8. MILTON’S LYCIDAS 6 (C.A. Patrides ed., 1961). 
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years I have been trying to figure out what Paradise Lost9 means, and no 
one is holding a stopwatch on me and telling me that I must complete the 
task by next week, month, year, or millennium.  In fact, I get rewarded 
professionally by issuing interim reports; and if I happen to change my 
mind once, twice, or even ten times about what Paradise Lost means, I 
just publish my new view of the matter and add another item to my C.V.  
As the man said, nice work if you can get it. 
But there are fields of endeavor where this is not a tolerable 
situation—disputes must be settled promptly, for if they are not the 
entire business grinds to a halt—and law is one of them.  That is, legal 
actors often do not have “world enough, and time”10 to search for the 
meaning of an author (or authors in the case of the constitution, Supreme 
Court decisions, statutes, etc.).  Someone is, in fact, holding a stopwatch 
on them, and they have to get on with it and come up with something 
conclusive.  It is this difference between legal work and literary work (or 
the work of everyday domestic life) that explains why several contributors 
to this volume begin by acknowledging that the thesis that a text means 
what its author (or authors) intend it to mean is powerful and perhaps 
even true, but then go on to say that this view of the matter is 
incomplete or impoverished or unhelpful.  Thus, Kent Greenawalt 
concedes that intentionalists “can provide a strict account of meaning 
and interpretation that does not do violence to social facts and relevant 
values”11 (I do not know that values have anything to do with it), and 
Adrian Vermeule speaks of intentionalism’s “intuitive appeal”;12 but 
both quickly leave intentionalism behind and go on to lines of inquiry 
they consider more fruitful.  It might seem that Greenawalt and Vermeule 
are presenting alternative accounts of meaning—alternative answers to 
the question of what a text means—but in fact that are abandoning the 
topic of meaning or, rather, folding it into an account of how legal work 
is and ought to be done. 
To his credit, Samuel Rickless is very upfront about this: 
There are many who take for granted that the proper function of a judge is to 
interpret the law, in the sense of explicating its meaning . . . .  There is something 
 9. JOHN MILTON, ENGLISH MINOR POEMS, PARADISE LOST, SAMSON AGONISTES, 
AND AREOPAGITICA 93–334 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952). 
 10. ANDREW MARVELL, To his coy Mistress, in ANDREW MARVELL 24, l.1 (Frank 
Kermode & Keith Walker eds., 1990). 
 11. Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 536. 
 12. Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
607 (2005). 




to this: explication of meaning is certainly part of what judges should do when 
they adjudicate.  But the ultimate function of a judge is to adjudicate, that is, to 
resolve legal disputes, and there are many disputes that cannot, and many that 
should not, be resolved by appeal to the explication of meaning.13
Or, in other words, this “meaning” stuff is interesting and sometimes 
relevant, but when all is said and done, we have to get on with the job, 
and the search for meaning may be either inconclusive and therefore of 
no help or downright antithetical to the job because it generates absurd 
outcomes.  As an example of this latter liability, Rickless offers the 
legislators who promulgate a “no vehicle in the park rule,” but who 
intended by “no vehicles in the park” the meaning “no dogs in the 
city.”14  It would surely be wrong, he asserts, “for a judge to hold that 
the ordinance bans dogs from the city, but does not ban cars from the 
park.”15  Yes and no.  It might well be wrong as a matter of public policy 
and it would be a public relations disaster and therefore politically 
wrong, but it would not be interpretively wrong.  If it comes to light that 
those who enacted the rule meant by “no vehicles in the park” “no dogs 
in the city,” then that is what the rule means.  (All language is code-like, 
and what we have here is not a tension between ordinary, literal meaning 
and code meaning, but a tension between two forms of code meaning, 
one of which is shared by a larger public.)  You might then decide that 
for any number of reasons the polity cannot live with that meaning and 
move to set it aside; but you should be clear about what you are doing: 
you are rejecting the meaning of the rule so that you can apply it 
sensibly (sounds funny, doesn’t it?); that is, you would be ratifying 
Rickless’s dictum that in some instances disputes simply should not “be 
resolved by appeal to the explication of meaning.”16
Greenawalt makes the same point when he declares that much judging 
“never tries to determine exactly what is a text’s meaning,” and adds that 
often “proceeding in this manner is desirable.”17  Vermeule explains just 
why it might be desirable.  Searching for a text’s meaning (what he calls 
“maximizing intentionalism”)18 “neglects the direct costs and opportunity 
costs of searching further and further afield for evidence of legislative 
intentions.”19  Maximizers, he explains, might “become bewildered by a 
large set of conflicting evidence,”20 and as a result render decisions that 
were confused and inaccurate.  Better to have a “restricted set of 
 13. Rickless, supra note 7, at 521. 
 14. Id. at 521-22. 
 15. Id. at 522. 
 16. Id. at 521.  
 17. Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 537. 
 18. Vermeule, supra note 12, at 613. 
 19. Id. at 613-14. 
 20. Id. at 614. 
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resources”—a set of resources pre-identified as the place where meaning 
is to be sought and found—for then the interpreter knows in advance that 
the search for meaning can be confined to that set.  Vermeule names this 
strategy “optimizing intentionalism.”21  The optimizing intentionalist 
“employs a stopping rule: she declines to search further afield if the 
expected benefits of further search are less than the costs.”22  Such a 
rule, Vermeule concludes, “provides a justification for considering less 
than all probative information bearing on legislative intentions.”23  Such 
a rule does more than that: it provides a justification for abandoning the 
search for meaning when the going gets too tough or too expensive; and 
one wonders if the calculation underlying the justification—efficiency 
should trump figuring out what laws mean—would be welcomed if it 
were baldly stated.  Vermeule ends his essay by saying that it is his hope 
“to make interpreters and students of interpretation aware that the 
maximizing style is not inevitable, that it represents a particular choice 
among local decisionmaking strategies.”24  Yes, it represents a choice 
between interpreting and doing something else (a cost/benefit analysis).  
Someone who makes a choice in the direction Vermeule recommends is 
no longer an interpreter because he or she is no longer interested in the 
question “what does this text mean?” and has replaced it with the 
question, “what can we do with this text?,” the answer to which is 
“anything we like or think good.”  Scalia fears that searching for intention 
runs the risk of legitimizing the interpreter’s desires.25  He should be 
more afraid of what happens when that search is cut short, leaving the 
“interpreter” (no longer one) free to determine how best to reach a 
conclusion that reflects his or her policy preferences.26
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 628. 
 25. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 26. In a private communication, Professor Vermeule insists that he is not giving up 
the search for meaning in favor of a cost/benefit analysis.  Rather, he is saying that the 
optimizer will “capture intention more accurately than the maximizer.”  This makes 
sense only if what Vermeule means by the maximizer is someone who will go on 
looking for evidence of intention even after he is convinced that he has found it; and he 
will do this because, as Vermeule observes, he believes that “any source is in principle 
admissible.”  Vermeule, supra note 12, at 613.  My reply would be that such a person 
would not be engaging in interpretation but in theorizing.  That is, he would be holding 
to the theoretical point that any conviction one holds could always be upset by evidence 
waiting around the next corner and that therefore no conviction is sufficiently secure 
until every last possible piece of evidence has been found and factored in.  In short, 




I am not inveighing against the employment of so-called stopping 
rules.  They are not at all unusual—remember again the rule that if you 
raise your hand at an auction, you have bought the pink elephant even if 
that was no part of your intention—and it is always possible to argue 
that they are necessary if the stability and predictability of the law are to 
be maintained.  My only point is that stopping rules are not rules of 
interpretation, but rules that tell you when the effort to interpret should 
cease and something else should take over.  I am perfectly willing to 
concede that in some instances (maybe many), the search for meaning is 
either so difficult that keeping at it paralyzes the system or so subversive 
of the purposes law is supposed to fulfill that insisting on it would be 
perverse.  I would just say that acknowledging the obstacles to the 
specification of meaning, or the un-wisdom in some cases of bothering 
about meaning at all, does not change the fact that the answer to the 
question “what does a text mean?” is that a text means what its author 
intends it to mean; and if that is so, a text intended by no author has no 
meaning because it is not a text. 
III. 
This is the way to think about the extended example offered by Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong who supposes that lightning has struck a tree “and 
leaves marks on the tree” that could be taken to spell “STOP.”27  He 
given this view, interpretation is, in the words of the English poet Edmund Spenser, 
“endless work.”  EDMUND SPENSER, THE FAERIE QUEENE bk. IV, canto xii, stanza 1, l. 1 
(A.C. Hamilton ed., 1977).  Such an interpreter would not be in danger of capturing 
intention less accurately than the maximizer.  Rather, he would be in danger of never 
getting to the point where intention came into view because, given his theoretical 
position, that point could never arrive.  It is one thing to say that an interpretation can 
always be revised in the light of new information: that is just an empirical fact about the 
history of interpretations.  It is quite another to say that evidence not now known, but 
theoretically discoverable in some shadowy future, perhaps never encountered, should 
hang over the empirical effort of determining the intention of an utterance or writing.  It 
is again the difference between interpreting and theorizing.  What this means is that there 
are no maximizing intentionalists or, more precisely, those who perform as maximizing-
intentionalists are not intentionalists at all but just (bad) theorists.  Absent the distinction 
between maximizing and optimizing intentionalists, we are left just with intentionalists; 
that is, with interpreters who are looking for evidence of intention.  Where they decide to 
look or not to look will depend on where they believe evidence of what they seek is 
likely to be found.  An intentionalist could very well decide that evidence is unlikely to 
be found in legislative history and could produce good empirical reasons for thinking so.  
But if the reason for not consulting legislative history is something like “the expected 
benefits of further search are less than the costs,” then the interpreter is no longer one 
because that is not an interpretive reason—a reason tied to the imperative of figuring out 
intention—but a reason that flows from the political and economic conditions prevailing 
in the enterprise. 
 27. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 465 (2005). 
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further supposes that over many years “drivers who approach the 
intersection and see the tree regularly stop,” and that when one day a 
driver fails to stop (should we say that he “ran the tree”?), his car is hit 
by another driver who relied on the expectation that those who 
approached the tree would stop.28  He then imagines that a trial ensues 
and a court “awards damages to the driver who was hit by the other 
driver who did not stop at the tree, and this decision is upheld on 
appeal.”29  Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, first, that this decision is not 
“obviously wrong” and, second, that the sequence of events “shows that 
the marks on the tree have a legally enforceable word meaning.”30  But 
these two points should be decoupled. Whether or not the decision is 
wrong is a question independent of the question of whether or not the 
lightning-produced marks have a meaning.  One could argue, for example, 
that a pattern of reliance and the expectations that grow up around it are 
sufficient to hold the second driver liable for acting imprudently, even 
recklessly.  One could argue further (although this might be stretching it) 
that it is a social good to enforce a custom even though there is no 
positive legal basis for it on the reasoning that “publicly accessible”31 
word meanings—even word meanings that are not there—are necessary 
to law’s predictability; that is, one must take into account the fact that 
everyone in the community treated the lightning-produced marks as if 
they formed a word.  But in the end, of course, they did not.  At best 
they resembled a word—no purposive agent formed them—and a court 
that based its decision on the fact that many in the community acted as if 
the marks had a meaning would be basing their decision on a mistake—they 
did not have meaning; they were just random marks—and what the court 
would be enforcing is not the word-meaning of the marks, but the 
mistake, made by many, of thinking that they had one.  (The idea of 
enforcing a mistake is not as odd as it sounds; that is what happened 
when gymnast Paul Hamm was allowed by a tribunal to keep his gold 
medal.)32  A court that decided that way would not be saying anything 
about the general interpretive issue of the relationship between meaning 
 28. Id. at 474. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 488. 
 32. Hamm was allowed to keep his gold medal in gymnastics in the 2004 Summer 
Olympics despite the fact that the Olympic judges made a scoring error.  The decision 
was finalized in arbitration at the Court of Arbitration for Sport.  For the Court’s detailed 
decision see http://www.tas-cas.org/en/pdf/yang.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2005). 




and intention—the court would be doing law, not philosophy of 
language—and it could come to its decision without ever pronouncing 
on whether or not the marks meant “stop.”  The legal question—should 
we enforce this pattern of behavior and thereby give legal weight to a 
long-standing and effect-producing mistake?—is absolutely distinguishable 
from the question debated at our conference: what is the meaning of a 
text?  A court that acted as Sinnott-Armstrong conjectures it might 
would be doing exactly what Vermeule’s optimizing interpreters are 
doing—bypassing the issue of meaning altogether and deciding on the 
basis of values—efficiency, stability, predictability—it thought more 
central to its task. 
Sinnott-Armstrong might reply (as he does in his essay) that what his 
hypothetical shows is that the question of meaning is settled by the 
community of interpreters and not by the intention of any author: marks 
can acquire a meaning even if no one intended it, so long as the meaning 
is agreed on by those who encounter them: “What gives the marks their 
meanings are the ways in which they are understood by the community, 
not the way in which they were produced.”33  This might be called the 
“interpreters (or readers) decide” principle and it is one frequently 
encountered in the literature.  Thus, for example, Richard Shusterman 
insists that “the necessary meaning-securing intentions could belong to 
readers of the text (or collectively to an interpretive community) rather 
than to its original ‘historical author.’”34  This position, he argues, is 
supported by the reception-history of texts, a history in which the 
specification of a text’s meaning undergoes repeated revision at the 
hands of subsequent generations of readers; it is the intentions of those 
readers, says Shusterman, rather than the intention of the author “that 
continue to guide and shape understanding . . . far beyond . . . authorial 
control.”35  As that understanding changes, the “properties and meanings” 
of the text change too, and indeed  “interpretation and knowledge are 
always rendering changes in the objects they appropriate.”36  The point 
is made concisely by Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr: “[R]eaders (and listeners) 
often . . . go beyond what a writer (or speaker) intended . . . .”37
Now as a matter of empirical fact, this is of course true: the history of 
reception provides much evidence of radically different meanings being 
posited for the same text; and one could say that such meanings “go 
 33. Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 27, at 475. 
 34. Richard Shusterman, Interpreting with Pragmatist Intentions, in INTENTION 
AND INTERPRETATION 167, 169 (Gary Iseminger ed., 1992). 
 35. Id. at 173. 
 36. Id. 
 37. RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., INTENTIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MEANING 261 
(1999). 
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beyond” whatever the author may have intended.  The question is: Does 
“go beyond” locate a failure in the effort to determine meaning—we 
were looking for the intended meaning but we overshot it—or does “go 
beyond” indicate an achievement in which the narrow intentions of 
authors are overcome in the name of reader liberation?  Is going beyond 
an unfortunate consequence of the difficulty, in some cases, of figuring 
out what an author means, or is going beyond what readers do when they 
are at their most creative, going boldly where no interpreter has gone 
before?  Clearly, Sinnott-Armstrong, Shusterman, and Gibbs would opt 
for the second alternative in which going beyond is a goal and a boast.  
But that surely is not what motivates those readers who strive to 
dislodge a previous interpretation and put a new one in its place.  A 
reader who does that believes that he or she has (at long last) discovered 
the true meaning of the text, the meaning its author intended.  If that 
were not the case, successive interpreters would not bother to argue that 
a previous reading was wrong, or that the evidence adduced for a rival 
interpretation was unpersuasive, or that new evidence has finally solved 
the puzzle.  If the point is just to be more ingenious than the last guy, 
why not get right to it and skip all that disagreement and demonstration 
stuff?  The whole process, along with the notion of “same” text, only 
makes sense if there is something everyone is after.  Sinnott-Armstrong, 
Shusterman, and Gibbs mistake an empirical difficulty—it is often hard 
to determine what a text means even when many interpreters have had a 
go at it for a very long time—for an agenda—the bizarre agenda of 
thinking up as many meanings for a text as you can.  Indeed, if that is 
your agenda, why stop at eliminating evidence and argument?  You 
might as well eliminate the text, which is what you will have done 
anyway if you operate under the assumption that interpretation always 
changes its objects (and it is a good thing too); for under that 
assumption—the assumption of the “readers decide” principle—the 
imperative is not to get it right (if only because there is no more “it”), but 
to come up with a reading that serves your present purposes and needs. 
One might object that in the end there is not that much difference 
between the “readers decide” position and the intentionalism offered by 
Larry Alexander, Steven Knapp, Walter Benn Michaels, and me.  We 
say repeatedly that intentionalism is simply the right answer to a 
question (what is the meaning of a text?) and not a method.  Knowing 
that it is intention you are after gives you no leg up when you are faced 
with the task of interpreting a particular text.  You still have to determine 




what the intention is, and more often than not that determination will 
involve disputes in which, by offering different accounts of the intention 
animating a text, interpreters will give different accounts of its “properties 
and meanings.”  Won’t the resulting history—a history of revision and re-
characterization—look very much like the history Shusterman describes 
as “a continuous and contested construction” of the text’s “understanding 
and interpretation”?38  It might, but even if the two histories—one 
occupied by seekers after authorial intention, the other occupied by 
interpreters who believed in their right (and obligation) to go beyond it—
were identical in their events, only members of the first group could give 
a reason (beyond the reason of having fun) for engaging in the enterprise 
and for approving or contesting the findings of others; only those who 
were seeking authorial intention would have an object that would give 
point and sense to their efforts. 
That is why a lot hangs on the intentionalist position even though 
nothing hangs on it methodologically.  (It does not tell you what to do; it 
just tells you what you are doing.)  Someone who believes that intention 
is what he or she is trying to determine has a question to ask of every 
piece of possible evidence that is turned up: does it bring me closer to 
identifying the object of my search?  Someone who believes something 
else has no question to ask either because his or her search has no object 
or because it has too many objects, and no way of distinguishing 
between them.  When all is said and done, there is only one coherent 
answer to the question “what does a text mean?”  It cannot mean what its 
readers take it to mean, for then the interpretive game would have no 
rules (and no possibility of victory) and would be an instance of what 
H.L.A. Hart derides as the game of “scorer’s discretion.”39  Nor, as we 
have seen, can it mean what the words alone mean (this is the textualist 
position, and not a possible one to hold) because absent the assumption 
of intention, the words alone (not really words; remember the lightning-
struck tree) do not mean anything.  Nor does it mean what the dictionary 
tells us about the words it contains, because what the dictionary gives us 
is a record of the intentions previous speakers have had when using a 
word, a record, that is, of possible and multiple meanings absent any 
way of specifying which is the right (that is, intended) one; (and besides, 
the next intender may well extend the range of usage—that is often how 
lexical change occurs—in a way that will require the revision of the 
dictionary.)  Nor does a text mean what is specified by the conventions 
of the day because conventions do not have intentions and they do not 
author texts.  Nor does it mean what the ordinary or ideal or reasonable 
 38. Shusterman, supra note 34, at 173. 
 39. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 142 (2d ed. 1994). 
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interpreter would mean by the words because none of those authored the 
text either, and declaring any one of them the author by fiat would 
amount to rewriting, not interpreting.  There is only one candidate left 
and one answer to the question: a text means what its author intends. 
If a text means what its author intends, many of the debates about how 
legal interpretation should proceed lose their urgency and become 
evidence of just how strong a hold a mistake may have on an entire 
discipline.  Consider, for example, John Manning’s essay, Textualism 
and the Equity of the Statute.40  Once you realize that in Manning’s view 
his title names two real choices of how to interpret, you know (or at least 
I know) that there is not going to be anything of theoretical value in the 
next 127 pages.  The first sentence of Manning’s second paragraph reads, 
“The question of text versus purpose has always troubled the law of 
statutory interpretation . . . .”41  No, it has not.  If statutory interpretation 
is what is going on (and remember it need not be), then by definition 
those engaged in it are trying to figure out the statute’s purpose.  What 
has troubled (if that is the word) statutory interpretation are the disputes 
between those who would describe its operations and imperatives 
differently, but these differences do not, indeed could not, translate into 
different ways of interpreting because there is only one way.  The 
history Manning rehearses is not (as he thinks it is) the history of the rise 
and fall of different interpretive options—there are no interpretive 
options, although there are different, not optional, ways of pursuing the 
task of determining intention, which is what interpretation necessarily 
is—but the history of the rise and fall of different ways of talking about 
interpretation.  When he reports that “the ‘plain meaning’ rule eventually 
supplanted the equity of the statute as hornbook law in England”42 or 
that early on “the Marshall Court began to shift to the faithful agent 
theory as the dominant constitutional foundation of statutory interpretation,”43 
he is reporting on shifts in the theoretical account of interpretation and 
not on a shift in its practice.  Now theoretical accounts have histories too 
and a scholar might well think it worth his and our while to tell the story 
of changes in the way statutory interpretation has been characterized.  
But we would not learn from such a story either how interpreting was 
 40. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2001). 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. at 55. 
 43. Id. at 86. 




done—we already know that; it was done by specifying or searching for 
intention—or how it should be done.  (We already know that too.)  The 
plain meaning rule might have supplanted the search for purpose in the 
hornbooks, but because the plain meaning rule cannot be followed—there 
is no meaning apart from purpose, and purpose cannot be inferred from 
the words alone—that fact is of no interpretive interest whatsoever.  
Interpretive interest might be returned to Manning’s essay if we thought 
of it as providing evidence of where different interpreters in different 
periods thought to look when seeking intention; for then we would be 
learning about different strategies for prosecuting the only task one can 
be engaged in and still be interpreting, the task of trying to figure out 
what some purposive agent intended. 
IV. 
Time to sum up, and I will do so with the help of an essay by Natalie 
Stoljar.  Professor Stoljar is surveying the various approaches to legal 
interpretation, and at one point she lists some of the standard objections 
to intentionalism.  First, she says, there is the “epistemological objection”44: 
because evidence of intention “is often equivocal, incomplete, or obscure, it 
will be difficult for an interpreter to offer convincing justification for the 
claim that a certain interpretation corresponds to an author’s actual 
intention.”45  But this is not an objection to the thesis that a text means 
what its author intends; rather, it is a complaint that determining exactly 
what that intention is may prove difficult.  If the thesis is correct, the 
empirical difficulty of acting on it is just that, an empirical difficulty and 
one that does not undermine intentionalism at all.   
To put the matter even more strongly, the intentional thesis is neither 
challenged nor supported by empirical evidence.  It has nothing to do 
with empirical evidence; its force is conceptual and is not derived from 
experience.  This is a difficult point and we might get some help in 
elaborating it from a moment in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism.46  In 
Lecture II, Rawls rehearses the basic elements of his concept of 
citizenship.  The last of these is “that citizens have reasonable moral 
psychology”47; that is, they “have a capacity to acquire conceptions of 
justice and fairness and a desire to act as these conceptions require.”48  
Rawls does not mean, as he hastens to assure us, that citizens actually 
 44. Natalie Stoljar, Survey Article: Interpretation, Indeterminacy and Authority: 
Some Recent Controversies in the Philosophy of Law, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 470, 479 (2003). 
 45. Id. 
 46. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 47. Id. at 86. 
 48. Id. 
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have any such desire as a matter of empirical fact.  Rather, he means that 
those who buy into what he calls “the political conception” must act as if 
they did, must assume—put on as if playing a role—the psychology 
ascribed (Rawls’s word) to them by the scheme of political liberalism.  
This psychology, in short, is, like the “original position,” an artifact and 
artifice of reason.  (Here Rawls follows Kant who declares that the inner 
moral status of citizens is irrelevant in a state organized by the formal 
imperative of respect for the autonomy of all, for in that state even devils 
will act as the imperative requires and so do the right thing despite 
themselves.)  That is why Rawls calls his psychology “philosophical, not 
psychological”: “It is not a psychology originating in the science of 
human nature but rather a scheme of concepts . . . for expressing a 
certain political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship.”49  
That is to say, Rawls’s moral psychology is not the answer to the 
question, “How do people actually behave?”—the question par excellence 
of Psychology as such—but the answer to the question, what model of 
behavior must be presupposed (that is, ascribed) if the basic scheme of 
the political concept is to be complete and rational.  As he says later in 
the text, “The absence of an explanation in cognitive psychology is not 
to the point”50 because the point is conceptual coherence, not fidelity to 
observed behavior. 
So it is with the intentional thesis.  The assertion that the act of 
interpreting is always and necessarily the act of determining intention is 
not the answer to the question “What is going on in the interpreter’s 
mind?”—a question that would require research into brain waves, 
cognitive processes, institutional practices, and much more.  Rather, it is 
the answer to the question “What must be the case—what must we 
presuppose—if notions like agreement, disagreement, error, correction, 
and revision—are to make any sense?”  The intentional thesis will not be 
defeated or even challenged by a list of the empirical difficulties (such as 
multiple authors, texts written long ago, authorship by impersonal 
institutions) facing the interpreter who is seeking intention.  The intentional 
thesis would be challenged and perhaps defeated if some other answer to 
the question “What does a text mean?” were shown to be rationally 
compatible with notions like agreement, disagreement, error, correction, 
and revision.  That has not happened, and I doubt that it ever will. 
 49. Id. at 86–87. 
 50. Id. at 120. 




A second standard objection—Stoljar calls it the “non-existence 
objection”51—is a relative of the first.  It says that in the case of groups 
like legislatures, “individuals within the majority have different aims and 
intentions in mind.  How should the individual intentions be combined to 
form a group intention that is plausibly the intention ‘behind’ the 
legislation?”52  Asked in a certain way, the question confuses intention 
with motive; while different legislators might have different motives for 
signing on to a piece of legislation, they could collectively form the 
intention to put the legislation on the books.  But suppose different legislators 
meant something different by the words of the legislation—the word was 
“canard” and some were voting for “ducks” and others for “false 
stories.”  What then?  Well, as J.L. Austin might say, that is an infernal 
shame, for then you would have two texts and two meanings and no way 
of reducing them to one, and you would have to figure out another way 
to proceed.  This, however, would be an unusual instance; in most cases 
a multiauthored text presents no particular problem to interpreters.  The 
very theorists who bring the “non-existence” objection against the 
intentionalism of Knapp and Michaels happily read them as having a 
single intention.  Or consider, as another example, Perri O’Shaughnessy, 
a best selling author of popular mysteries.  On the inside back cover of her 
books, it is revealed that “she” is actually a pair of sisters.53  Nevertheless, 
the copy at the front of the book, written by people who surely know, 
speaks of O’Shaughnessy’s achievement and O’Shaughnessy’s plots; 
and the writers who blurb the books, also in the know, offer their praise 
to the realized intention of an author.  But what if it came to light that 
one sister intended to write a straightforward whodunnit and the other 
intended to write an allegory of the war on terror, and neither knew what 
the other was intending as the manuscript was passed back and forth 
between them?  Once again you would have two intentions and two texts 
and two meanings and reviewers would be at a loss to know what to 
review.  A quandary, to be sure, but not one that would call into question 
the fact that a text means what its author intends. 
There is another possibility; not two persons with different intentions, 
but one person with different intentions.  This, Stoljar tells us, is the 
“indeterminacy objection”:54
Even in the simplest cases, such as those of the interpretation of contemporary 
texts by single authors, authors often have several intentions at the same time.  
 51. Stoljar, supra note 44, at 479. 
 52. Id. 
 53. A biography of the sister-authors can be found on their website.  See 
http://www.perrio.com (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).  For an example, see PERRI 
O’SHAUGHNESSY, INVASION OF PRIVACY (1996). 
 54. Stoljar, supra note 44, at 479. 
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For instance, authors may have in mind both specific examples of the 
application of a clause, for example, to permit racial segregation, and a general 
aim, for example, to enshrine a principle of equality.55
Such authors, however, would not have two intentions, but one: the 
intention to permit segregation; and they would have that intention 
within the assumption that segregation and equality are compatible.  
(This is of course the majority in Plessy.)56  One could argue that they 
are wrong to think so and that segregation is by definition antithetical to 
the principle of equality; but that would be an argument about the 
reasoning that led them to have the single intention they have, not an 
argument about whether or not they have it or whether or not they have 
two.  Could an author have contradictory intentions and employ the 
same words as the vehicle for both of them?  Sure, but in that case we 
would speak of an author “of two minds” with each of the minds 
producing its own text with its own meaning.  In short, the mystery-
writing sisters again, but this time crammed into a single skull.57
I am sure that there are more puzzles to ponder and more ingenious 
hypotheticals designed to show that a text’s meaning is more than or less 
than or other than the meaning its author intended.  But enough is 
enough, life is short, time is fleeting, and I have to rest my case. Here, 
one last time and for the record, it is: 
– A text means what its author intends. 
– There is no meaning apart from intention. 
– There is no textualist position because intention is prior to 
text; no intention, no text. 
– There is no choice between intentional meaning, conventional 
meaning, dictionary meaning, and the meaning imputed to the 
ordinary, or exceptional, or reasonable man, only choices 
between alternatively posited intentions. Dictionaries and 
conventions do not have intentions; the ordinary or exceptional 
or reasonable man did not author the text you are interpreting. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896). 
 57. See THE THREE FACES OF EVE (Twentieth Century Fox 1957); Sybil (NBC 
television broadcast, 1976). 
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– If you are not trying to determine intention, you are not 
interpreting; but sometimes interpreting is not what you want 
to be doing (although before you do something else, you 
should be sure you have good reasons). 
– The intentions of readers, except for the intention to 
determine intention, do not count as interpretations, but as 
rewritings. 
– None of the above amounts to a method.  Knowing that you 
are after intention does not help you find it; you still have to 
look for evidence and make arguments. And thinking that it is 
something else you are after will not disable you if you are 
really interpreting; for then you would be seeking intention 
even if you said you were not. 
–  Interpretation is not a theoretical issue, but an empirical one, 
and, therefore, all debates about the nature of interpretation 
should stop.  (Fat chance!) 
That’s it.  Have a nice day.  (And what did I mean by that?) 
 
